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MCBRIDE-WILLIAMS IGNORE PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION WHICH DEMONSTRATE THAT THE SPECIFIC 
PROVISIONS OF THE ACT ARE CONTROLLING 
In their brief, McBride- Williams fail entirely to address the controlling authority 
cited in Dixie Regional Hospital's initial brief regarding well-established principles of 
statutory construction. The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (the "Act"), Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14-1 et seq., clearly provides that no malpractice litigation against a health 
care provider may be commenced until the plaintiff satisfies conditions which "are 
compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-14-12(l)(c) (Supp. 2002) (emphasis added). The Act further specifies that a 
medical malpractice claimant must have "complied with all conditions precedent to the 
commencement of litigation regarding the claim" and must satisfy "all conditions 
precedent required under this section prior to the commencement of litigation." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3)(b)(ii), -12(3)(c)(ii) (Supp. 2002) (emphasis added.) By the 
plain language of the Act, it is clear that the prelitigation panel review processes set forth 
in Section 78-14-12 are operative in the commencement of a medical malpractice action 
and determine when and how an action can be commenced. 
Significantly, plaintiffs do not dispute that each word in the phrase "compulsory 
as a condition precedent to commencing litigation" is to be given effect. Instead, 
1 
plaintiffs simply avoid any analysis of the terms "compulsory," "condition precedent to 
commencing litigation," "required," and "prior to the commencement." Moreover, 
plaintiffs do not dispute that "A condition precedent is one . . . which is to be performed 
before some right dependent thereon accrues, or some act dependent thereon is 
performed." Black's Law Dictionary, (6th Ed. 1991). 
Furthermore, McBride-Williams fail to address that the inclusion in the Act of 
language specifying requirements which are "compulsory as a condition precedent to 
commencing litigation" is unique among Utah statutes. No other Utah statutory 
provision specifies conditions precedent to "commencing litigation." 
Principles of statutory construction and interpretation are well established: 
In matters of statutory construction, "[t]he best evidence of 
the true intent and purpose of the Legislature in enacting [an] 
Act is the plain language of the Act." "[Statutory enactments 
are to be construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and 
meaningful." Likewise, we are compelled to give the 
statutory language meaning and to assume that "each term in 
the statute was used advisedly . . . unless such a reading is 
unreasonably confused or inoperable." We will avoid an 
interpretation which renders portions of, or words in, a statute 
superfluous or inoperative. 
Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1997) {citations omitted) 
Moreover, McBride-Williams' assertion that a medical malpractice action is 
commenced simply by filing a complaint runs contrary to the entire prelitigation process. 
In addition to specifying that a malpractice action must be commenced within two years, 
the Act imposes additional requirements that must be satisfied in order for the filing of a 
complaint to commence the malpractice action. The legislature included carefully crafted 
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safeguards in order to preserve the statute of limitations from running against a diligent 
medical malpractice claimant. First, if the notice of intent to commence an action "is 
served less than ninety days prior to the expiration of the applicable time period, the time 
for commencing the malpractice action against the health care provider shall be extended 
to 120 days from the date of service of notice." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 (1996). 
Second, "The filing of a request for prelitigation panel review under this section tolls the 
applicable statute of limitations until the earlier of 60 days following the division's 
issuance of an opinion by the prelitigation panel, or 60 days following the termination of 
jurisdiction by the division as provided in this subsection." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-
12(3)(a). The obvious purpose behind the inclusion of these provisions is to provide a 
specific set of conditions which will prevent the statute of limitations from running 
during the time a claimant is prevented by specific statutory restriction from commencing 
a medical malpractice action prior to satisfying the conditions precedent which the 
legislature has mandated for a medical malpractice action. 
Also, McBride-Williams fail to acknowledge that the provisions included in the 
1985 amendments to the Act govern as the more recent expression of legislative intent. 
As this Court has held, "We conclude that by enacting . . . the more recent statute, the 
Utah Legislature intended to amend or qualify . . . the earlier statute." Murray City v. 
Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Utah 1983). Indeed, "[T]he later expression of the 
legislature controls when statutes conflict or overlap in their treatment of the same 
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subject matter." State in Interest of R.N.J., 908 P.2d 345, 349 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 
(citations omitted). 
McBride- Williams disregard the specific provisions governing medical 
malpractice claims and, instead, seek to apply an interpretation that gives effect only to 
the default provisions of the general savings statute set forth in Section 78-12-40. 
However, "such an interpretation runs contrary to the established rule that when two 
provisions address the same subject matter and one provision is general while the other is 
specific, the specific provision controls.''' Dairyland Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 882 P.2d 1143, 1146 (Utah 1994). ~[I]t is well settled that a more specific 
[statutory] provision always takes precedence over a more general [statutory] provision." 
Taghipour v. Jerez, 2001 UT App 139,lj 10, 26 P.3d 885 (citing State v. Hinson, 966 
P.2d 273, 277 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (alterations in original). McBride-Williams' 
"argument ignores the well-established rule of construction that specific statutory 
provisions prevail over general statutory provisions." Id. 
McBride-Williams' attempts to impose a general provision over a more specific 
statutory provision is demonstrated by their reliance on Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. McBride-Williams' argument requires the erroneous assumption that any 
complaint filed within the statute of limitations is automatically effective and timely 
filed, and that the savings statute will therefore apply. McBride-Williams assert that 
because Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the default rule as to bow 
an action is generally commenced, filing of a complaint is enough to commence a 
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medical malpractice action for purposes of the savings statute. Although Rule 3 
addresses how an action is generally commenced, it does not specify when an action is 
commenced. Because Rule 3 is a general rule it is limited by the Act's specific mandate 
imposing additional conditions which "are compulsory as a condition precedent to 
commencing litigation" of a medical malpractice action. 
In Lamar v. Utah State Dept. of Tramp., 828 P.2d 535 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), the 
court rejected a similar attempt to apply a general rule from the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure despite the existence of a more specific statutory provision. In Lamar, the 
plaintiff argued that by complying with the general requirements of Rule 4 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure he had effectively served notice of his claim. The court 
rejected this argument and held, "Section 63-30-12, however, is more specific than Rule 
4 in that the former requires notice on UDOT and the attorney general. When two or 
more statutory provisions appear to conflict, the more specific provision governs over the 
more general provision." Id. at 541. 
As set forth in Dixie Regional Medical Center's initial brief, other jurisdictions 
have recognized that while the general rule for commencing an action includes the filing 
of a complaint, if other statutory conditions are required, then mere filing of a complaint 
will not commence an action. McBride-Williams have failed to refute the reasoning 
expressed in Gessner v. Phillips County Commissioners, 11 P.3d 1131 (Kan. 2000), as 
set forth in the initial brief. In addition, Michigan requires a medical malpractice 
claimant to submit an affidavit of merit in order to commence litigation which is 
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analogous to Utah's condition precedent requiring prelitigation panel review. The 
Michigan Supreme Court held: 
The trial court, however, ruled that plaintiffs failure to file 
an affidavit of merit with his complaint rendered the 
complaint null and void. The court then reasoned that 
because the filing was a nulity, it did not toll the period of 
limitation and therefore plaintiffs claims was time-barrred 
months before the affidavit was finally furnished. . . We find 
no error with the trial court's analysis. Generally, a civil 
action is commenced when a complaint is filed. However, 
medical malpractice plaintiffs must file more than a 
complaint; they "shall file with the complaint an affidavit of 
merit. Use of the word "shall" indicates that an affidavit 
accompanying the complaint is mandatory and imperative. 
We therefore conclude that, for statute of limitations purposes 
in a medical malpractice case, the mere tendering of a 
complaint without the required affidavit of merit is 
insufficient to commence the lawsuit. 
Scar sella v. Pollak, 607 N.W.2d 711,713 (Mich. 2000) (citations omitted). See also 
Young v. Sellers, 2002 WL 31875155, __N.W.2d _ (Mich. Ct. App.2002) ("the failure 
to timely file a complaint and an affidavit of merit will not toll the applicable limitation 
period. To commence a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must file both a complaint 
and an affidavit of merit."). 
In Keller v. Tavarone, 655 N.W.2d 899 (Neb. 2003), after the plaintiffs first 
medical malpractice complaint had been dismissed for failing to comply with "a 
condition precedent to commencement of a suit," the appellant filed a second medical 
malpractice complaint "expressly relying on the 'savings clause.'" Id. at 237-38. The 
Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed the district court's finding that the savings clause 
was inapplicable." Id. at 238. The court held, "the filing or presentment of a claim to the 
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appropriate political subdivision is a condition precedent to commencement of a suit 
under the Torts Claims Act." Although plaintiff had failed to satisfy the condition 
precedent to the commencement of her action, the plaintiff argued that her dismissed 
complaint was a claim "made under any other law of this state" and that she had an 
additional 6 months from the dismissal of the first lawsuit to file a claim under the 
savings statute. The court held, 
If [plaintiffs] argument were correct, then any potential 
claimant who had allowed the 1-year filing deadline of the 
Tort Claims Act to pass could revive that claim by filing a 
lawsuit in district court. When that lawsuit was dismissed, 
the claimant could then file a claim with a political 
subdivision. Clearly, [plaintiff s] broad reading of [the 
statutory language] is inconsistent with the legislative 
purpose expressed by the 1-year filing deadlines. 
Ma t 241-42. 
Though McBride-Williams seek to apply the savings statute, they essentially 
ignore the fact that the Act imposes conditions precedent to how and when a medical 
malpractice action can be commenced, which conditions precedent prevented their filing 
of their Initial Complaint from commencing their medical malpractice action in "due 
time." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12;.Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40. 
POINT II. 
MCBRIDE-WILLIAMS' RELIANCE ON MADSEN V. BORTICKIS 
MISPLACED. 
McBride-Williams erroneously state tha: according to Madscn withe term 
'commence,' for purposes of the Savings Clause, means filing the complaint, regardless 
7 
of failure to comply with condition precedent litigation requirements." (McBride-
Williams' Brief at p. 3.) However, McBride-Williams' mischaracterization becomes 
evident when the Madsen decision relied on by McBride-Williams is placed in proper 
context. With that context in view, it becomes apparent that this Court did not suggest in 
Madsen that the savings statute would have preserved or revived those claims to which 
the notice of claim requirement applied, but only to a claim where there was no notice 
of claim requirement. Thus, the equivocal statements that McBride-Williams rely on 
should not be read in the broad manner suggested by McBride-Williams. 
The case cited by McBride-Willams, Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 
1988), herein Madsen II, is the second in a series of three reported cases. The history of 
these cases began when 
Plaintiffs sued the State of Utah and Borthick in his official 
capacity as Commissioner of the Department of Financial 
Institutions for failure to discharge their statutory duties. The 
trial court dismissed that action against both defendants for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
This Court affirmed in Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 
(Utah 1983) (Madsen I). We held that the State was immune 
from suit under the Governmental Immunity Act. We also 
held that the Governmental Immunity Act precluded Borthick 
from being sued in his official capacity as Commissioner. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4 (1978). Although we 
indicated that Borthick could be sued in his individual 
capacity for gross negligence, fraud, or malice under Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-4, we affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' 
complaint against Borthick because they had not alleged any 
of those causes of action. 
Madsen v. Borthick, 850 P.2d 442, 443 (Utah 1993) (emphasis added), herein Madsen 
III In Madsen I, the Court upheld the dismissal of the plaintiffs' initial complaint "for 
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'failure to sate a claim upon which relief could be granted' because the investors, in 
suing the State and state officers in their official capacities, had failed to file the 
statutorily required notice of claim within the allotted time." Madsen II, 769 P.2d at 246. 
Thus, the savings statute was never at issue in Madsen I. 
Following this Court's affirmance of the first dismissal, the plaintiffs then filed a 
second complaint against the individual defendants as individuals. 'They named as 
defendants Borthick and Brimhall in their individual capacities and alleged that the 
Commissioners had been grossly negligent in failing to comply with their statutory duties 
in licensing and supervising Grove." Madsen III, 850 P.2d at 443. Because there were 
no statutory conditions precedent to suing individuals in their individual capacity, the 
plaintiffs had not failed to satisfy any conditions precedent to commencing litigation 
against Borthick and Brimhall in their individual capacities at the time the first 
complaint was filed. As a result, this Court 
held that because the first action had been timely commenced 
and had not been concluded on the merits, Utah Code Ann. § 
78-12-40 tolled the statute for one year from the date of our 
decision in Madsen I. Because plaintiffs had filed the second 
action within a year after Madsen I, their claims were not 
time-barred. 
Madsen III, 850 P.2d at 443. 
Finally, in Madsen III, this Court upheld the dismissal of the actions against 
Borthick and Brimhall in their individual capacities because uBorthick and Brimhall 
owed no duty to plaintiffs as individuals." Id. at 447. 
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The course of proceedings underlying Madsen //reveals the mistake of the 
conclusion espoused by McBride-Williams that "the term 'commence/ for purposes of 
the Savings Clause, means filing the complaint, regardless of failure to comply with 
condition precedent litigation requirements." (McBride-Williams' Brief at p. 3, 
emphasis added.) McBride-Williams' own statement ignores the express qualification to 
the application of the savings statute expressed in Madsen II: "Section 78-12-40 
provides that a plaintiff whose action fails on grounds other than its merits may have one 
year from the date of the failure to file a new action so long as the first action was 
'commenced within due time.'" Madsen II, 769 P.2d at 254 (emphasis added). 
Because there was no statutory condition precedent to commencing suit against Borthick 
and Bollinger in their individual capacities, the filing of the first complaint commenced 
the action against the individuals within due time. Thus, the quotation from Madsen II, 
upon which McBride-Williams' reliance is based, is distinguishable from the present 
circumstances where statutory conditions precedent were not satisfied. The reason 
plaintiffs were considered to have commenced the first action in due time and allowed to 
file a second complaint in Madsen //under the savings statute was because the 
Governmental Immunity Act did not impose any condition precedent to filing a claim 
against the defendants in their individual capacity. Contrary to the implication of 
McBride-Williams' argument, there is absolutely no suggestion in Madsen II that the 
savings statute would have revived McBride-Williams' action against the State or the 
individual defendants in their representative capacities "regardless of failure to comply 
10 
with condition precedent prelitigation requirements." (McBride-Williams' Brief at p. 3.) 
As a result, the language in Madsen II referring to the savings statute and the notice of 
claim requirement was not necessary to the Court's holding that the actions against the 
defendants in their individual capacities were timely commenced within the original one 
year period.7 
In addition, Madsen II is not controlling here because the Court was not presented 
with the unique language from the Act which sets forth more specific requirements that 
are "compulsory- as a condition precedent to commencing litigation." As previously set 
forth and undisputed by McBride-Williams, the Act is unique among all Utah statutes in 
that it is the only statute specifying "conditions precedent to commencing litigation." 
The Madsen II Court simply was not presented with the specific issues pertaining to the 
Act. 
Plaintiffs' reliance on three other cases is also misplaced. McBride-Williams 
argue that in Malone v. Parker, 826 P.2d 132 (Utah 1992), this Court's use of the term 
"initiate" in the place of "commence" somehow "cast[s] serious doubt upon any 
interpretation of the 'commence.' which would transform it into anything other than the 
simple meaning of starting or initiating the lawsuit by filing the complaint in Court" 
(Appellant's Brief at p. 10, n. 4.) However, the Court in Malone was not even presented 
]This Court continues to require strict compliance with the notice requirement in 
the governmental immunity context. "In order to sue a governmental entity under these 
parameters, potential plaintiffs must first provide, as a prerequisite to filing suit, formal 
"notice of claim" to the appropriate governmental official." Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 
UT 16, \ 10, 40 P.3d 632 (Utah 2002). 
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with the possible application of the savings statute. Unlike the established principle of 
construction "that the legislature used each word advisedly", Arredondo v. Avis Rent A 
Car System, Inc., 2001 UT 29, ^  12, 24 P.3d 928, there is no established principle of 
construction that a Court used each word advisedly in rendering a decision. Moreover, 
the Court in Malone clearly recognized that, "Although the panel's review is informal 
and nonbinding, such a review is a compulsory condition precedent to initiating 
litigation." Malone v. Parker, 826 P.2d 132, 133 (Utah 1992). Thus, Malone actually 
refutes McBride-Williams' construction which ignores such specific qualifications added 
by the Act. 
McBride-Williams also refer to Standard Fed. Sav. & Loan v. Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 
1136 (Utah 1991). However, the issues in Standard Federal are distinguishable from 
those now before the Court because that case was not dealing with the specific language 
of the Act. In fact, the statutory provision at issue in Standard Federal was simply 
determined to be a 3-month statute of limitations. In contrast, the language of the Act 
reflects a plain intention to bar forever a medical malpractice unless the plaintiff satisfies 
conditions which "are compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c) (Supp. 2002) (emphasis added). As set forth 
previously in the discussion regarding statutory construction, it is evident that if an action 
cannot be commenced unless and until conditions precedent are satisfied within the 
applicable statute of limitations, the claimant will be barred from bringing the claim at a 
later date. 
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Moreover, to the extent Madsen II and Federal Savings refers to Foil v. Foil v. 
Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979), the Madsen II Court was referring only to the 
notice of intent provision of section 78-14-8. The Foil Court relied heavily on fact that 
"the Legislature in 1979 amended the notice of intent provision to clarify its original 
intent. . . that a notice of intent to sue was not necessary to ''commence an action."' The 
Court further relied heavily on its reasoning that "The amendment also changed the word 
'commenced' to 'initiated' to make clear that the usual rule for determining when an 
action is commenced should apply" and that "The amendment to section 78-14-8 was 
made to establish the Legislature's intent that a notice of intent to sue was not the 
operative fact in the commencement of an action." Id. at 150. As set forth in Dixie 
Regional Medical Center's initial brief, the 1985 amendments to the Act significantly 
limit the application Foil The 1985 legislation makes it clear that the prelitigation panel 
review process added in § 78-14-12 are operative in the commencement of a medical 
malpractice action and determine how and when a medical malpractice action can be 
commenced. The addition of legislatively-mandated compulsory conditions precedent to 
commencing litigation of a medical malpractice action set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-14-12 has superseded prior cases which allowed application of the savings statute 
on the basis that failing to provide a notice of intent as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-
14-8 was not operative in the commencing of an action. 
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POINT III. 
PUBLIC POLICY DOES NOT FAVOR IGNORING STATUTORY 
REQUIREMENTS BECAUSE MCBRIDE-WILLIAMS FAILED TO TAKE THE 
MINIMAL STEPS NECESSARY TO PRESERVE THEIR CLAIMS. 
It is undisputed that the Act governs the medical malpractice claims of McBride-
Williams. Under the Act, both Dixie Regional Medical Center and Dr. Huard are health 
care providers. 
The consequence of being labeled a "health care provider" 
under section 78-14-3(11) is that the label affords the bearer 
certain procedural protections against lawsuits. For example, 
if one wishes to file a complaint against a health care 
provider, one must first give the health care provider ninety 
days prior notice of intent to commence an action. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14-8 (1992). One must then submit the 
cause to a hearing panel composed of a member of the Utah 
State Bar, a licensed health care pro\ ider practicing in the 
same specialty, and a lay panelist. Id. § 78-14-12 
(Supp.1994). One may then file an action in an appropriate 
court, provided that the timing of the action falls within the 
abbreviated statute of limitations period provided by section 
78-14-4. 
Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 897 P.2d 1228, 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). These 
statutory "protections against lawsuits" specificalK include the legislative mandate that 
before an action can be commenced, the conditions precedent specified in section 
78-14-12 must have been satisfied. By its express terms, the Act specifies that the 
prelitigation review process is to occur in order to commence any litigation. 
In section 78-14-12, the legislature made clear that panel 
review is to be a precondition to the commencement of a 
malpractice action: "The proceedings are informal, 
nonbinding . . . but are compulson us a condition precedent 
to commencing litigation" Id ^ ^8-14-12(1 )(c) (emphasis 
14 
added). In addition, to remove any doubt that panel 
review is to occur prior to any litigation, the legislature 
used the term "prelitigation" to describe the panel or its 
activities no less than ten times. Id. § 78-14-12(l)(b), (2)(a), 
(3), (5)(a), (7), (8)(b). Finally, the legislature unambiguously 
provided that panel review would toll the applicable statute 
of limitations: "The filing of a request for prelitigation panel 
review under this section tolls the applicable statute of 
limitations until 60 days following the division's issuance of 
an opinion by the prelitigation panel." Id. § 78-14-12(3). 
Thus, a cursory examination of this section reveals that the 
legislature is quite adept at both mandating panel review of 
claims as a precondition to litigation and tolling applicable 
statutes of limitations. 
DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 852 (Utah 1996) (Russon, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added). 
Despite the clear statutory establishment of additional "protections against 
lawsuits," McBride-Williams simply chose to ignore the requirements imposed by the 
Act. McBride-Williams disingenuously attempt to justify their disregard of the 
conditions precedent by noting they "were acting pro se" and characterizing their blatant 
disregard of the conditions precedent as "missteps under Utah Code Ann. 78-14-12." 
(McBride-Williams' Brief at p. 11, n. 5.) However it is undisputed in the record that 
even before they had filed their initial complaint, McBride-Williams had "been warned 
about the need to follow required pre-litigation procedures." R. 52. Correspondence 
dated April 6, 1999, from a Utah attorney advised McBride-Williams, "I have sent along 
the Utah Statutes pertaining to medical malpractice. In addition to the two-year statute of 
limitations, there are other requirements. It would be best if you retained an attorney." 
Further, in correspondence dated May 19, 1999, McBride-Williams Appellee Teresa 
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McBride admits, "I am aware the statute is 2 years in Utah." In addition, in a letter dated 
July 1, 1999, McBride-Williams Appellee Teresa McBride was advised, "You should be 
aware that state and federal laws limit the time frame within which a legal action may be 
brought in this type of case. The period of time available for filing a legal action is 
determined through application of the relevant statute of limitations in your jurisdiction 
to the facts of the case. If you should have any questions on the statute of limitations 
issue, you should consult a legal professional without delay." The court found at that 
time that "McBride-Williams' decision to attempt the interstate, pro se litigation of a 
complicated and sophisticated legal matter is simply foolhardy." R. 51-53. 
Despite McBride-Williams having "been warned about the need to follow 
required pre-litigation procedures," (R. 152), McBride-Williams ignored such warnings 
and disregarded the requirements of the Act by filing their Initial Complaint on 
September 15, 2000, prior to satisfying the Act's requirements which are "compulsory as 
a condition precedent to commencing litigation." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c) 
(Supp. 2002). Although McBride-Williams refer to "policy considerations" without any 
substantiation, (McBride-Williams Brief at p. 11,) McBride-Williams nevertheless fail to 
delineate any policy sanctioning their knowing failure to satisfy the conditions by 
application of the savings statute. 
In contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that statutory provisions in the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act prevented a litigant commencing an action 
until a mandatory conditions precedent had been satisfied. Hallstrom v. Tillamook 
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County, 493 U.S. 20, 25-31, 110 S.Ct. 304, 308-311, 107 L.Ed.2d 237 (1989). The court 
held, 'The equities do not weigh in favor of modifying statutory requirements when the 
procedural default is caused by petitioners' 'failure to take the minimal steps necessary' 
to preserve their claims." Id. at 27. The Court further reasoned, iCIn sum, we conclude 
that none of petitioners' arguments requires us to disregard the plain language of [the 
statute]. '[I]n the long run, experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural 
requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded 
administration of the law.'" Id. at 31. Because McBride-Williams failed to take the 
steps to satisfy the statutory conditions precedent to commencing litigation, the mere 
filing of a complaint prior to satisfying the statutory conditions precedent could not and 
did not commence their medical malpractice action within due time. Thus, 
McBride-Williams should not be allowed to knowingly disregard the requirements and 
time frame established by the Act through simply filing a complaint and resorting to the 
application of the savings statute. 
II. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, IHC Health Sendees, Inc. dba Dixie Regional 
Medical Center respectfully requests that the Court reverse the ruling of the trial court 
and find that the statute of limitations has run barring McBride-Williams' claims against 
IHC Health Services, Inc. dba Dixie Regional Medical Center. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ?y_day of March 2003. 
BURBIDGE & WHITE 
,/Brinton R. Burbid 
Paul D. Van Komen 
Attorneys for IHC Health Services, Inc. dba Dixie 
Regional Medical Center 
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